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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, Jr. 
Defendant-Appellant 
vs 
RUTH C. ALLEN, 
PIaintiff-Respondent 
Case No. 14 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a motion by a husband to modify 
a divorce decree to reduce or eliminate alimony 
enti rely. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After original petition by the Defendant and 
Appellant, the Trial Court reduced the amount of 
alimony still to be paid, to one hundred dollars 
($100.00) even though the children of the marriage 
were of adult status and the Plaintiff was self 
supporting. 
1. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant and Defendant seeks a change of 
Order entered below and remanded to the District Court 
with instructions to modify the divorce decree to reduce 
alimony to a nominal amount or discontinue it entirely, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A decree of divorce in the above-entitled 
matter was dated originally on the tenth day of 
October, 1968, by the Honorable Alden J. Anderson, Judge. 
That judgment required that the Appellant and 
Defendant pay to the Plaintiff and Respondent in this 
action the sum of $200.00 per month alimony and $200 
per month for the minor children of the parties. 
That for at least six months — or until the 
Plaintiff and Respondent secured w o r k — t h e Appellant and 
Defendant in this action be required to pay the amount 
of the mortgage payment (or share with Plaintiff when 
she secured work) of the home occupied at 1218 Harvard 
Avenue in Salt Lake City, until such property should be 
sold and thereafter the proceeds of the sale should 
be divided equally. Plaintiff paid nothing for six months 
There was thereafter a Petition for Modification 
of that decree which was presented to the Honorable 
Emmett Brown, which he declined to grant in any respect. 
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That matter was subsequently appealed to this Court and 
was cited as one of the authorities in this action 
called: Allen vs Allen. 
The Appellant and Defendant renewed by Petition 
to the District Court of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, presided over at that time by: 
Maurice J. Harding, for a reduction of alimony payments 
to a nominal amount or to discontinue it altogether. 
The Judge reduced the alimony payments still 
required to be made by the Appellant and Defendant 
from $200.00 to $100.00 a month. Thereafter he was 
requested in an appropriate pleading to reconsider his 
decision to reduce the alimony to a nominal amount 
or discontinue it altogether. 
As a result of the subsequent hearing and the 
testimony presented to him at that time — a copy of which 
is made a part of this record--he reduced the alimony 
from $100.00 to $70.00 a month. 
It is the contention of the Appellant and De-
fendant in this action, based upon the record which is 
before this Court, that based upon the relative circum-
stances of the parties that alimony should either be 
reduced to a nominal sum or be discontinued altogether. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR 
IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO REDUCE 
ALIMONY TO A NOMINAL AMOUNT, OR TO 
DISCONTINUE ALIMONY ALTOGETHER. 
A divorce court has continuing jurisdiction 
under 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to make 
subsequent changes for new orders with respect to the 
maintenance and support of the parties and their childr 
It has already been brought to the Court's 
attention that the reason for this petition is because 
of the marked and significant changes which have occurr 
in the circumstances of the parties since the matter wa 
last reviewed judicially. 
The Appellant and Defendant submits to the Court 
as grounds for terminanting permanent alimony the cases 
which indicate trends toward an ultimate termination of 
such alimony as might be awarded. 
The leading case in Utah respecting these 
matters is McDonald vs McDonald found 236 P 2nd, 1066. 
This case is important by reason of the fact 
that it is a painstaking review of those things which 
the Court should take into account when determining 
whether alimony should be reduced or terminated. 
4. 
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These considerations are fifteen (15) and are 
carefully set forth by Mr. Justice Crockett in the Opinion 
This case has been cited innumerable times and has 
never been discarded by our Supreme Court nor has it been 
overruled by this Court. 
In that case, the Plaintiff brought an action 
against Defendant wife for decree of divorce. 
The grounds were habitual intoxication for a 
period of four years. The evidence indicated 
that she was physically and psychologically 
debilitated and that the likelihood that she 
could gain employment was diminimus. The 
parties had been married for some considerable 
time and had one grown child, who lived 
away from home. The Defendant was granted the 
home in which the parties had resided, all 
the household furnishings and fixtures and every-
thing except an automobile which was awarded to the 
plaintiff. There was also awarded to the defen-
dant's wife the sum of ten dollars (10.00) per 
month in alimony. It was considered by the Court 
that even under those circumstances that 
nominal alimony was sufficient. 
In the case before this Court, at the entry of the 
original decree, the Plaintiff was awarded the house, 
furniture, fixtures, one automobile, support for minor 
children and $200.00 a month alimony. The decree provided 
for the divison of the equity of the house which was held 
by the parties in the event that it be sold, was to be 
divided. It was sold and the proceeds were divided. 
The evidence presented to this Court demonstrates 
that the Plaintiff has training; that contrary to alleged 
statement in the original decree, the Plaintiff had 
5. 
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obtained employement within a week after the divorce 
was entered, and that the Plaintiff has continued said 
employment to this time. 
Additional evidence with respect to the circumstnaces 
of the parties indicates that sufficient payment has been 
made in terms of alimony alone during the past six and 
one-half years since the original divorce, so that a sum 
in lieu of permanent alimony would now have been paid 
under any normal circumstances. 
There have been sufficient changes in the circumstances 
of the parties to warrant this Court's termination of 
alimony and also because in addition to the change of 
circumstances, it is against the law and inequitable to 
require the Defendant to pay continuous alimony. 
The Court's attention is invited to the case of 
Wilson versus Wilson, 296 P 2nd, 980. In this 
action, the Plaintiff, wife, was granted a 
divorce. She filed the action at the request 
of the Defendant so that he could marry another 
woman. The Trial Court awarded the real property 
and furniture to the wife and alimony in the sum 
of $50.00 a month until $5,000 had been paid. 
The Appelate Court reduced this sum which would 
take eight and one-third years to pay, and cut 
the amount to be paid to $2,400 unless the 
Plaintiff's remarriage occurred first. 
Even under these unusual circumstances where the 
Defendant requested the Plaintiff to get a divorce for 
the specific purpose of remarrying, the Court did not see 
fit to grant permanent alimony; and, indeed, cut the 
alimony approximately in half. 
6. 
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In Christensen versus Christensen, 442 P2nd, 512 
The McDonald case was referred to. This was an 
action by the husband against the wife. The 
marriage had lasted for 25 years, the parties 
had 5 children, 2 of those had not obtained their 
majority and were still at home. The Court granted 
the Plaintiff the divorce and all of the property 
and furniture was awarded to the Defendant, $100.00 
per month for each of the minor children and $2,400 
in alimony payable at the Plaintiff's option either 
in a lump sum or $100.00 a month. 
The Defendant contended that she should have 
permanent alimony and the Court should provide 
it in order to avoid the possibility that she 
might become a public charge. 
Under this point the McDonald case was cited. In 
a unanimous decision of the Utah Supreme Court, written by 
Mr. Justice Crockett, the following language appears with 
respect to the contention that she should have permanent 
alimony: 
"The defendant's argument carried to its con-
clusion would mean that whenever a marriage 
has lasted for any considerable number of years, 
the wife would always be entitled to permanent 
alimony. We do not regard this as the law! 
Nor did we so intend in the statement in 
McDonald which, incidentally, was quoted by 
the Trial Judge." 
It should be noted that this Court has wide latitude 
and wide discretion in making appropriate adjustments and 
in terminanting alimony and will not be reversed by an 
Appelate Court unless there has been a clear abuse of 
discretion. This is a general doctrine set forth in 
Harding versus Harding, 488 P2nd, 309. 
7. 
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The Defendant refers this Court to the case of 
DuBois versus DuBois, 504, P 2nd, 1381. This 
was an action by the wife for divorce and there 
was a division of marital estate in the sum of 
some $588,000. Sixty percent of it was awarded 
to the Plaintiff. The evidence showed that a 
part of the estate was a result of investments 
of funds obtained from the Plaintiff's relatives. 
The Plaintiff was awarded $350.00 in alimony and 
$10,000 in Attorney's fees. There was an appeal 
from the division of the property, the alimony 
and the attorney's fee. The Supreme Court 
affirmed all of it except the alimony which was 
reduced to one dollar a year. 
It is scarcely necessary to remind this Court that the 
power to modify which resides in this Court, includes the 
right to terminate alimony and upon the intention of the 
Court to terminate it, alimony cannot thereafter be 
reinstated. This appears to be the law in our State as well 
as in surrounding states. 
The case of Graham versus Graham, 345 P2nd, 316, 
California, reiterates the doctrine that only the 
clearest indication of abuse by the Trial Court's 
jurisdiction would justify any sort of modification 
by the Appelate Court. 
In Utah, case of Knighton versus Knighton, 387, 
P 2nd, 91 , the Defendant husband asked the Court 
for a reduction of alimony. After a review 
of the evidence presented to the Irtial Court, it 
was concluded that sufficient difference in the 
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS SHOWN BY THE ORIGINAL 
findings and decree and those shown to the Court 
at the time of the supplemental decree justified 
the order made and a reduction of alimony was 
made to $1.00 per montTTT 
A review of the legal propositions upon which the 
Defendant relies in this hearing is commended to the Court 
as set forth in Lockhart versus Lockhart, 259 P2nd, 385. 
8. 
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This case remains the law of the State of Washington and 
has not been ove-ruled. It underlines the growing trend 
in divorce cases not to award permanent alimony. 
In Lockhart versus Lockhart, the wife brought 
an action for divorce. She was awarded the real 
property and personal property of the parties 
and was awarded $500 a month for nine months and 
then $150 per month until the further order of 
the Court. The defendant, husband, appealed 
asking for termination of alimony. The Supreme Court 
used this language in its decision: 
"It is not the policy of the law, nor 
is it either just or equitable that a 
wife be given a perpetual lien upon her 
divorced husband's earnings. She has 
chosen to go her own way, to abandon 
all of the obligations she assumed by her 
and cannot call upon him marital vows 
The 
to continuously contribute to her support." 
Court said further: "the amounts payable 
by terms of the Commissioner's order (this is 
equivalent under Washington practice to a 
Master whose findings are adopted by a Trial 
Judge) are now overdue." . . ."It may be 
an undue hardship upon the Appellant to 
satisfy them in a single payment. The case 
will be remanded, therefore, with instructions 
to inquire into conditions and enter 
such a decree as circumstances warrant. 
The Decree will be so framed as to relieve the 
Appellant of any further liability after he 
pays to the Respondent the sums awarded to 
her by the Commissioner, withour interest." 
Reference is also made here to Ring versus Ring, 
29 Pac 2nd 436. This is a case of reduction of 
alimony from $600.00 a month to $1.00 a year, 
This is a general statement of law. It is applicable 
in this case because of the statement of the Court with 
respect to the fact that the Court continues to have 
jurisdiction over a divorce and decree. 
9. 
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It also makes reference to those facts which have been taken 
into account by the Court and stipulated to by the parties. 
This case reiterates the suggestion that the Court 
is the ultimate determinate of what is fair and equitable, 
It says that the Court may and can make appropriate 
adjustments "unless such complicated facts lead to the 
manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity," 
CONCLUSION 
It is the contention of the Appellant and Defendant 
in this action that there has not only been substantial 
and marked changes in the circumstances of the parties, 
but that the Plaintiff is perfectly able of taking 
care of herself and her financial situation is secure; even 
more than that of the Defendant. 
That the Respondent and Plaintiff in the above-
entitled action is no longer entitled to any payment of 
alimony by the Appellant and Defendant. 
The Plaintiff chose to abandon her vow and all 
of her marital obligations to go her own way when 
she filed for divorce. 
The entire record of this matter and those 
processes which have been necessarily employed indicate 
with absolute clarity that the Plaintiff in the original 
action has for her own benefit and that of the children 
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of the marriage received more than she could have 
reasonably expected by law and equity to receive. 
Any further payment to her for whatever reason is 
totally unconscionable and unjust. 
Based upon the assessment of the facts and 
circumstances which have heretofore been submitted to 
this Court, and based upon the matters presented to 
this Court now, the law applicable thereto, it is 
submitted that alimony in this case should be terminated 
and that any amounts owing to the respondent and plaintiff 
under the original decree be paid at a rate which does 
not impose any unnecessary and undue hardship upon the 
Appellant and Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur A. Allen, Jr. 
417 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
A COPY OF THE FOREGOING BRIEF HAS BEEN RECEIVED 
ON THIS DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1975. 
Gary Frank 
Attorney for Respondent 
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